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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellant Brigham City filed this appeal from an interlocutory order of the First 
District Court, Brigham City Department granting Defendants' ("Appellees'") Motion to 
4 
Suppress Evidence. This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to U.C.A. Sec. 
78-2a-3(2)(d) (Supp. 2001) and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE: DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN RULING THAT THERE WAS NO 
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCE TO JUSTIFY THE WARRANTLESS 
ENTRY INTO THE RESIDENCE? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
THE COURT OF APPEALS WILL NOT DISTURB THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS UNLESS THEY ARE CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS, BUT THE TRIAL COURT'S LEGAL CONCLUSIONS 
BASED UPON THOSE FINDINGS ARE REVIEWED ACCORDING 
TO A NONDEFFERENTIAL CORRECTION OF ERROR STANDARD. 
AUTHORITY: 
STATE V.BEAVERS, 859 P.2D 9, 12 (UTAH APP. 1993) 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and to 
what extent police officers are allowed to enter a private residence without a search 
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warrant is determinative in this appeal. The Fourth Amendment reads as follows: 
"the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or Affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the person or things t6o be seized." U.S. CONST. Amend. IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE: 
Brigham city appeals from an interlocutory order of the trial court granting 
Defendants' Motion to Suppress Evidence. The trial court found that no 
exigent circumstances existed to justify the officers' unwarranted entry 
into the residence. 
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS: 
The Defendants were arrested and charged with various minor 
misdemeanors arising from an incident at a Brigham City residence. The 
cases were filed into the First District Court of Utah, Brigham City 
Department, in and for Box Elder County. These cases were assigned to 
Judge Clint S. Judkins. 
On Nov. 14, 2000, Defendants filed a Motion to Suppress, asserting that 
the entry into the residence violated their rights against unreasonable 
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search and seizure. On March 22, 2001, arguments were heard on the 
motion. 
DISPOSITION BELOW: 
Judge Judkins granted Defendants' Motion to Suppress, finding that there 
was no exigent circumstance to justify a warrantless search of the 
residence. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On July 23,2000, at approximately 3:00 a.m., Brigham City police 
received a call complaining about a loud party at 1074 Orchard St. in Brigham city, and 
officers were dispatched. Upon their arrival, the officers determined that no one was in 
the front part of the house and the noises and loud voices were emanating from the rear. 
They declined to knock on the front door, citing concerns for their safety, and went 
around the house down the driveway to the backyard where there was a six-foot privacy 
fence around the yard. The officers testified that they saw two minors in the backyard 
consuming alcohol. (At this point there was a serious question as to whether the officer 
meant he saw what appeared to be two minors apparently consuming what appeared to be 
alcohol—for generally one must verify a person's age and investigate the contents of a 
container to know for sure, but the officer was adamant that the look through the slats of 
the privacy fence was enough for him to be certain.) The officers also testified that the 
two persons in the back yard said, "Oh, he's just had too much beer," apparently in 
reference to the noise coming from inside the house. They then entered the back yard 
through the closed gate. Subsequently they observed through the kitchen window four 
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adults restraining and trying to calm another youth. The officer testified he saw the 
youth free a hand and strike one of the adults. There was a great deal of yelling and 
struggling and the officer testified that the person whom he saw get hit was at the sink, 
rinsing the blood out of his mouth with water whereupon on officer opened the door, 
stepped in, and announced his presence. When no one paid attention to him, he stepped 
in front of the adults and more forcefully announced his presence. He then testifies that it 
still took a lengthy period of time for anyone to acknowledge him. 
The officers arrested the three juveniles, releasing one to his parents, and 
five adults (one had been in bed asleep at the time). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Warrantless searches of a private residence arc per se unreasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions. Proving that a warrantless entry into a home falls within the 
exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement is a particularly heavy 
burden that the prosecution must bear. There must be a showing of both probable cause, 
which is what the police would have to show to get a warrant, and an exigency that 
demanded immediate action such that it outweighs the protection afforded by the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. What it is that would constitute probable cause 
to search the house in this case was never articulated by the prosecution, nor has it been 
in Appellant's brief. Likewise, why the trial court's findings demand a concurrent 
finding of exigent circumstances has never been explained. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT DO NOT PRECLUDE A 
FINDING THAT NO EXIGENCY EXISTED 
The trial court did find that there was an altercation ongoing within the house, and 
that one adult had been "smacked in the nose" by a juvenile. At the same time, the trial 
court, recognizing the serious protection afforded by the warrant requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment, found, in paragraph 5 of the Order on Motion to Suppress, no 
exigent circumstances sufficient to justify the officer's entry into the residence. 
(Emphasis added.) These are not inconsistent. Not every "exigent circumstance" can 
justify a warrantless search. Mincey v. Arizona 437 U.S. 385, 394-395. Indeed, the cases 
upon which the prosecution relies for their "emergency exception" exigency are not at all 
similar to the instant case. In Pursifull, the police were responding to a call that there 
was a gunshot victim and arrived at the home to find a mortally wounded man receiving 
emergency medical attention in the driveway, and a trail of blood to and from the front 
door. This justified a warrantless search of the home for additional victims, but only for 
that purpose. Similarly in Mincy, an undercover agent had been killed in a drug bust and 
the residence was searched for additional victims. Anything additional required a 
warrant. In the instant case, the officer said he saw a person whose "injury" required that 
he stand at the kitchen sink to rinse some blood off. There is no explanation as to how 
that would give rise to a reasonable belief that the person was in need of "immediate 
assistance." 
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EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING A WARRANTLESS ENTRY DID NOT 
EXIST 
A. WARRANTLESS ENTRY INTO A PRIVATE DWELLING IS AN 
EXTREME MEASURE AND REQUIRES EXTREME CIRCUMSTANCES 
FOR ITS JUSTIFICATION. 
The Fourth Amendment generally prohibits the warrantless entry of a 
person's home, whether to make an arrest or to search for specific objects. 
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); Johnson v. United States, 333 
U.S. 10 (1948). As a matter of fact, the physical entry of the home is the 
chief evil against which the Fourth Amendment is directed. United States 
v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297,313 (1972). For this reason 
warrantless searches and seizures within a home are per se unreasonable 
absent exigent circumstances, and any exception to the warrant 
requirement must fall within one of a carefully defined class of cases, 
which are specifically established and well-delineated. United States v. 
Anderson, 981 F.2d 1560, 1567 (10th Cir. 1992); U.S. v. Bute, 43 F.3d 531, 
534 (10th Cir. 1994). For this reason, the Prosecution "bears the 
particularly heavy burden of proving the warrantless entry into a home 
falls within the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant 
requirement." State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9,13 (Utah App. 1993); Welsh v. 
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-750. Even if the Prosecution could meet 
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that "particularly heavy burden" and show that the facts of this case fall 
within one of the few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions to the warrant requirement that have been recognized, they 
must also show that probable cause existed. State v. Beavers, 14. Since 
the Fourth Amendment always requires probable cause as a basis for entry 
into a private residence, even when exigent circumstances exist, the end 
result is that there must be a showing that the officers had the requisite 
probable cause and could have gotten a warrant, but that the exigent 
circumstances which existed necessitated immediate action, and the need 
for that action was compelling enough to outweigh the privacy interest 
which is jealously guarded by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States. 
B. THE CIRCUMSTANCES UPON WHICH THE PROSECUTION 
RELIES AS "EXIGENT' ARE NOT SO RECOGNIZED FOR THE 
PURPOSES OF JUSTIFYING AN EXCEPTION TO THE 
REQUIREMENT OF A WARRANT FOR ENTRY INTO A HOME 
UNDER THE LAW. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the "application of the 
exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a home entry should 
rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a 
minor offense.. .has been committed." State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 
14(footnote 6) (Utah App. 1993) quoting Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 
740, 753. The "minor offense" to which the Supreme Court refers in 
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Welsh is DUI. The Utah Court of Appeals correctly points out that DUI is 
an offense that is hardly minor in an absolute sense. DUI is directly 
responsible for a staggering death toll each year and a far greater number 
of personal injuries and an immense amount of property damage. In this 
regard it has to be considered far more serious an offense than anything 
with which these defendants have been charged. Yet in the context of 
comparing it to the sanctity of a person's home and the protection afforded 
by the Constitution to the privacy interest therein, it is a minor offense, and 
the exigent circumstances exception to the prohibition against warrantless 
entry does not apply. How much more does the term "minor" apply to the 
offenses with which these Defendants have been charged? 
Warrantless entries are justified with probable cause and exigent 
circumstances because in such circumstances, the delay to obtain a search 
warrant would risk "physical harm to the officers or other persons, the 
destruction of relevant evidence, or the escape of the suspect." Beavers, 
quoting United States v. Lindsey, 877 F.2d 777, 780 (9th Cir. 1989). There 
is no basis to believe that the officers needed to enter the house to prevent 
harm to themselves. Interestingly enough, the officers do not indicate that 
the entry was made to prevent harm to anyone else, either. Their claim is 
that they tried to get the attention of the occupants and took the youth into 
custody after determining that he was intoxicated. The only threat of harm 
that has ever been alleged was that one adult male had been punched by 
the youth. When the officers entered the house, the adult and the youth 
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were already separated, and there was no longer any threat of harm to 
anyone, if ever there was. The officers' actions belie any concern for 
injury. They did not offer any medical attention to anyone nor did they 
check to see if any was needed. If the officer's testimony is to be 
believed, the most that can be said is that one adult had suffered an injury 
so minor that all that was required to take care of it was rinsing his mouth 
out with water. By the time they entered the house he was already out of 
harm's way. No weapons were observed; there was no search done for 
any. There was no claim that any one was in imminent danger of injury, 
let alone serious injury. 'The need to protect or preserve life or avoid 
serious injury is sufficient justification for what would be otherwise illegal 
absent an exigency or emergency." Wayne v. United States, 115 U.S. 
App.D.C.234,241. 
THE POLICE PRESENCE IN THE BACK YARD WAS AN UNLAWFUL 
INTRUSION. 
The expectation of privacy held by the owners of this private property and 
their guests extended to the back yard. It was not a public place, neither was it 
open, especially at that time of day. The yard was fenced and gated. Since they 
were out on a call of a "loud party," they should have knocked on the front door 
and /or rang the doorbell to get someone's attention and ask whatever questions 
were necessary to make sure the situation was under control. There was no 
probable cause justifying entry into the back yard. Even if they could have seen 
the two persons that were in the back yard at the time, that which they saw could 
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only give rise to some reasonable suspicion, not probable cause for entry onto 
private property. Absent that intrusion, there could be no reason to claim any 
knowledge of any situation that could possibly give rise to probable cause or 
exigent circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
To justify the warrantless entry into a private residence, the Prosecution 
bears a very heavy burden. They must show that the police had probable cause such that 
it would have supported the issuance of a search warrant and they also must show that 
there was some exigent circumstance present creating such an emergency that they 
needed to act immediately, and that need was so compelling as to override the general 
rule that all searches and seizures in a private residence require a warrant issued by a 
neutral judge. For this reason the claims of probable cause and exigent circumstance are 
not measured by what the officers in the field subjectively thought was reasonable at the 
time, it is absolutely an objective standard. 
Even if this Court were to do so, the exception to the rule requiring a warrant 
would not apply, for the underlying offenses are minor. We urge this Court to affirm the 
decision of the trial court below. 
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